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1.  Introduction 
In this paper we utilise unpublished Australian manufacturing establishment census data 
covering the period of 1994 to 1997 to study how trade liberalisation may lead to 
productivity gains. Earlier studies such as Chand (1999) and Bloch and McDonald (2002) 
have found evidence that the reductions in domestic industry assistance in Australia in late 
1980s through early 1990s are associated with improvement in productivity.
1 It is still not 
clear from these studies, however, what sorts of mechanism leads to such possibly 
desirable outcome. As a result, a further study which tries to improve our understanding of 
the mechanism is potentially worthwhile, especially given the potential policy 
implications in terms of the performance of the Australian manufacturing sector.   
At the micro level, there are several possibilities of how a more open trade regime may 
lead to a higher productivity.  Levinsohn (1993), for example, tested the old idea that the 
international trade increases competition. He tested the hypothesis that increased 
competition on the domestic market as trade barriers and other subsidies to domestic 
producers are reduced may lead to lower price-cost margin and improved allocative 
efficiency or to lower costs and improved productive efficiency or both. This hypothesis is 
often referred to as the “imports-as-market-discipline” hypothesis. Recent firm level 
theoretical and empirical studies such as Melitz (2003) and those reviewed by Tybout 
(2000, 2003) have also confirmed the hypothesis. Similarly, it is also possible that the 
competitive pressure may push firms to reduce their slack and x-inefficiency by using 
inputs more efficiently or through the increased availability of cheaper imported inputs 
(Holmes and Schmitz, 2001; Fernandes, 2007). 
                                                 
1 See also the extension of Chand (1999) by Oczkowski and Sharma (2001) and Mahadevan (2002) and the 
reference within.   3
Another possible mechanism also consistent with the above hypothesis is the idea of less 
efficient firms exiting the market while surviving firm increases in size to move 
downward along their decreasing cost curve through economies of scale or learning by 
doing.
2 More recent studies focus on the investigation of which of these two mechanisms 
dominates, if any. In addition, they also look at whether or not a possible third mechanism 
namely embodied technology in increased imported products, is important. For example, 
Schor (2004) found that nominal tariff and tariff on intermediate inputs have negative 
impacts on Brazilian manufacturing firm productivity indicating the possible importance 
of greater knowledge diffusion through embodied technology imports. In terms of exit 
decision, one of recent studies is Pavnick’s (2002) which found that trade liberalisation 
increases the probability of firm exit especially in sectors in which the domestic country 
have no comparative advantage and in which firms produce goods which compete with 
imports.  
The focus of our paper is on how the documented productivity gains from trade 
liberalisation in Australia is realised. In particular, we study how Australian firms respond 
to the increased competition from abroad in terms of market presence decision and/or size 
of output and employment. Similar to Gibson and Harris (1996), we investigate which 
manufacturing establishments exit as the industry declines with the gradual introduction of 
trade liberalisation. In addition, following Gu, Sawchuck, and Whewell (forthcoming), we 
also examine firms response to such decline in terms of their employment to investigate 
whether or not increasing returns to scale explain the observed improvement in 
productivity as import competing industries possible enlarge with the more open 
economy. Finally, similar to Gaston (1988), we examine establishments’ adjustments in 
                                                 
2 See, for examples, Rodrik (1988, 1991), Olley and Pakes (1996), Roberts and Tybout (1996), and Aw, 
Chen and Roberts (1997) as cited in Pavcnik (2002).   4
terms of employment. However, unlike these earlier studies, ours is conducted at the 
establishment level.
 3
In order to link firm responses to trade liberalisation as described above, we make use of 
unpublished, establishment level manufacturing census data for the financial years of 
1993-94 and 1996-97 from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) and the four-digit 
industry classification variation in the reduction of the effective rate of assistance (ERA).
4 
We estimate the average effects of both absolute (measured in each percentage point) and 
proportional (percent) reduction on ERA on the probability to exit and the proportional 
change the size of output and employment of the establishments.  
Section 2 provides a brief discussion on the gradual trade liberalisation in Australia in the 
mid-1990s. Section 3 provides a brief review of relevant theoretical and empirical studies. 
Section 4 provides an explanation of the empirical model and the construction of measures 
used to estimate the model. Section 5 provides and discusses the estimation results. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Australia trade liberalisation in the mid-1990s 
In an effort to prevent from a falling standard of living relative to other developed nations, 
the Australian government began a gradual trade liberalisation process of its 
manufacturing sector in the early 1970s with the announcement of a 25 percentage point 
tariff reduction by the Withlam government. For various reasons such as deteriorating 
balance of trade, however, the degree of liberalisation varies across the different industries 
within the manufacturing sector. For example, while tariffs were reduced in the textile, 
                                                 
3 Fernandes (2007) also found that the gains in productivity from trade liberalisation vary positively with 
increases in imported intermediate inputs. Due to lack of relevant data, we do not investigate this possible 
channel.   5
clothing, footwear and motorcar industries with the announcement of Whitlam 
government, significant quantitative restriction measures were introduced and continued 
in effect until early 1990s which would then lead to increased protection in these 
industries in the earlier period of trade liberalisation. As time goes by, however, these 
industries are among those with the largest cuts in ERA percentage point wise as shown in 
Figure 1 below. Overall, by mid-1990s the average effective rate of assistance (ERA), 
defined as the percentage mark-up per unit of output relative to the hypothetical case of no 
trade protection nor subsidy, fell from around 36 per cent in 1970-71 to 6 per cent in 
1996-97. 
As shown in Figure 1, the extent of trade liberalisation during the period of study varies 
significantly across the industries in the manufacturing sector. Apparel, textiles, paper 
products and footwear industries, for example, experienced more than 8 percentage point 
reduction in ERA. On the other hand, industries such as printing, non-metallic mineral and 
wood products received less than 5 percentage point reduction. We exploit this variation at 
the four digit ANZSIC industry classification to identify the effects of trade liberalisation 
on the probability of establishment exit and the change in firm level employment between 
1993-94 and 1996-97 using unpublished establishment level data from two censuses of 
Australian manufacturing establishments held in these periods. More specifically, we use 
three measures of the extent of trade liberalisation based on the change in ERA namely, 
percentage change in ERA, percentage point change in ERA, and percentage change in the 
power of protection defined as the percentage change in (1+ERA).
5 Table 1 summarises 
these three different measures of trade liberalisation across broad industries. 
                                                                                                                                                   
4 See Industry Commission (1995). 
5 We thank Jonathan Pincus for suggesting the last measure.   6
Figure 1: Average Reductions in Effective Rate of Assistance, 1993-94 -- 1996-97 
(percentage points) 































3.  Trade liberalisation and domestic firms’ response 
As explained in the previous section, trade liberalisation in Australia is a gradual process 
that is similar to the case of New Zealand analysed in Gibson and Harris (1996). In their 
paper, Gibson and Harris argued that the effects of the phased nature of New Zealand 
trade liberalisation can be analysed under the framework of establishments faced with 
declining demand models. They summarised a number of theoretical predictions from 
these models. For example, when demand declines, establishments with higher variable 
costs would exit earlier (Dierickx, Matutes and Neven, 1991; Reynolds, 1988). The   
intuition from Dierickx, Matutes and Neven is that because of trade liberalisation there is a 
reduction in consumer’s willingness to pay (WTP) due to improved availability of cheaper 
or better substitutes through imports. This reduction in WTP affects the high variable cost 
establishments more than the low variable cost ones.   7
Table 1: Extent of trade liberalisation by manufacturing sector, 1993-94 – 1996-97 
Sector  Average extend of trade liberalisation 
 percentage  point 
reduction in ERA 
percent reduction in 
ERA 
percent reduction in 
(1+ERA) 
Apparel 10.7  21.3  7.0 
Basic chemical  4.2  13.1  3.5 
Beverages 4.3  33.9  3.8 
Ceramics 4.7  38.7  4.2 
Electrical equipment  7.1  56.0  6.3 
Electronic equipment  6.8  49.1  6.0 
Food and tobacco  0.5  48.1  0.3 
Footwear 8.0  47.3  6.5 
Furniture 7.9  58.3  7.0 
Glass 1.0  25.0  0.1 
Industrial machinery  5.6  50.9  5.0 
Iron and steel  4.5  30.8  3.9 
Leather product  6.9  24.2  5.4 
Metal products  7.7  58.0  6.7 
Motor vehicle and parts  6.1  30.5  4.9 
Nonferrous metal  -0.3  2.2  -0.4 
Non-metallic mineral  2.8  31.7  2.5 
Other chemical  5.7  37.9  4.9 
Other manufacturing  7.0  58.0  6.1 
Other transport  6.5  17.2  5.2 
Paper 8.8  61.1  7.6 
Plastics 6.6  54.2  5.9 
Printing 2.9  16.0  2.6 
Professional equipment  4.7  41.4  4.2 
Refining and coal  3.7  28.3  3.2 
Rubber products  5.7  48.8  5.1 
Textiles 10.3  18.4  6.7 
 
Other characteristics found to be important include the relative age and size of the 
establishments. Age is important since it possibly relates to the scrap value of the 
establishment, with newer establishments are possibly easier to scrape due to higher resale 
value (Baden-Fuller, 1989). On the other hand, if there is learning-by-doing, older 
establishments may have lower relative costs or higher productivity. Size is important as 
shown by Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985), for example. They showed that when   8
production is all-or-nothing and establishments have the same costs, larger establishments 
may exit earlier because the smaller establishments suffer less loss and thus has higher 
expected net profits as a monopoly once every other establishments have exited the 
industry. Also important is whether or not the establishments belong to a firm with 
multiple establishments or to a diversified firm. For diversified or multi-establishment 
firms, Baden-Fuller (1989) argued they can move resources across their establishments 
more easily and thus avoid, say, labour termination costs resulting in a higher probability 
for establishments under such firms to exit.  
In general, these important correlates of establishment closures have also been identified 
by more recent firm heterogeneity studies that looked at correlates of establishment 
closures empirically such as Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson (1988, 1989) and Bernard 
and Jensen (2002) and theoretically under dynamic industry model such as Hopenhayn 
(1992) and Melitz (2003). 
Another aspect of the possible impacts of trade liberalisation relates to changes in output 
and employment. Instead of exiting the market completely, it is possible for domestic 
establishments to respond by reducing their scale of operation when faced with declining 
demand to cut losses by improving efficiency. For example, in the extension of their 
earlier work, Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1990) allow for continuous capacity adjustment 
and find that the larger establishments would shrink into the smaller establishment’s size, 
and then they would shrink together along with the shrinking demand. On the contrary, if 
the domestic market is relatively small, it can be argued that a reduction in tariffs may lead 
to domestic firms’ reducing activities in non-profitable import competing sector and 
increasing specialisation in which they have comparative advantage. This specialisation    9
would end up in the firms serving a larger international market and thus leading to 
economies of scale and productivity gains (Harris, 1984; Cox and Harris, 1985; as cited in 
Gu, Sawchuck and Whewell, forthcoming). 
4.  Empirical Model and Data  
4.1.  Probability of exit 
We follow the modeling framework of Gibson and Harris (1996) which is, as explained 
earlier, based on models of firms when the industry is declining. As argued by them, this 
modelling framework is appropriate for the case when trade liberalisation is introduced 
gradually such as in the case of New Zealand, the subject of their study, and Australia, the 
subject of ours. Facing a declining demand in its industry i, a firm f considers whether or 
not to close its establishment p which operates in that industry by comparing the expected 
revenue of keeping it operating to the opportunity cost. Firm f closes down establishment 
p when the expected opportunity costs of keeping p operating exceed the expected 
revenue. 
As discussed in the previous section, factors that may increase the expected opportunity 
costs of keeping p operating includes production costs, current resale value of the 
establishment and other assets, and the potential “external” benefit of establishment p 
operating  that may flow to other establishments that f owns. For examples, with declining 
demand, high cost establishments would be more likely to exit and so would 
establishments owned by diversified firms or establishments owned by multi-
establishment firms be because these firms can move away resources from the closed 
establishment to other establishments. On the contrary, if sunk investment costs are 
important, then the resale value might be low even for new establishment, reducing the 
probability of exit. In addition, exit might occur in a decreasing order of firm size. This   10
means, the largest single-establishment firm might exit first, all else equal. In summary, 
we follow Gibson and Harris (1996) in using these insights to select control variables in 
our reduced form empirical model of establishment probability of exit in addition to our 
main variable of interest, which is the relative extent of trade liberalisation in the industry 
where the establishment operates.
6
 Let  ) , , , , ( i pi pi pi pi E S r C h τ π =  denotes the expected profit from keeping establishment p 
operating in industry i as a function of establishment p’s production cost, resale value, 
externality for firm f’s other establishments, and trade protection of industry i entering 
through industry i demand. Then, defining  1 = p Exit  if establishment p exits and 0 
otherwise, we model establishment p’s probability of exit as  
p i p p x Exit ε β τ + Λ = = ) ; , ( ] 1 Pr[  (1) 
where   is a distribution function specified so that (1) can be estimated as a standard logit 
model, x is a vector of observable establishment p’s characteristics, β is the corresponding 
vector of parameters to be estimated, and 
Λ
p ε   is a random term assumed. From the 
previous discussion, the establishment characteristic vector x  contains variables that 
capture variations at (i) the industry level such as the extent of trade liberalisation and 
market concentration, and (ii) the establishment level, such as production costs, size, and 
whether or not the establishment belong to a multi-establishment and/or diversified firm. 
4.2.  Output and employment adjustments 
As discussed earlier, it is also possible for firms to adjust their employment or output 
levels instead of closing down completely. For example, surviving firms may be able to 
expand their output by specializing and serving other markets through export (Bernard et 
                                                 
6 See also the empirical specification of recent related studies such as Baggs (2005).   11
al., 2003). This rationalisation effect has been shown to be significant for Canadian 
manufacturing following United States - Canadian Free Trade Aggreement in early 1990s 
(Head and Ries, 1999). In terms of employment, Gaston (1998) surveyed the literature on 
how firms adjust to trade liberalisation and found that employment changes appeared to be 
the dominant method used by firm to adjust. However, in the same paper, using Australian 
manufacturing panel data at two digit ASIC classification from between 1973-74 and 
1991-92, he found small effects of the ERA reductions on employment and attributed 
most of the observed changes to the underlying structural reform.  
In this paper, we also investigate the extent of these two possible adjustments following 
ERA reductions at the establishment level since they may serve as channels for the 
observed improvement in productivity. More specifically, we re-estimate the reduced form 
equation (1) as standard linear regression with percentage change in output and 
employment as the dependent variable.     
4.3.  Establishment level data 
The censuses producing the data we use for our empirical analysis gather production 
activity statistics at the establishment level, business operations statistics at the 
management unit (MU), and some financial statistics at the enterprise group levels. The 
production activity statistics collected that we use include, for example, number of 
employees, wages, and output (ABS, 1997). The provided establishment identification 
number is useful in identifying which establishments belong to each MU and, more 
importantly, in defining which establishment exits the industry within the two period. For 
the latter, an establishment which appears in the 1993-94 census but not in the 1996-97 
census is classified as an exit. Originally, there are 52,263 establishments in the 1993-94 
census data. Using the above exiting establishment definition, approximately 47 per cent 
of the establishments exited between 1993-94 and 1996-97. Table 2 provides the number    12
Table 2: Establishment exit rate by manufacturing sector, 1993-94 – 1996-97 
Sector  Number of establishments in 1993-94  Exit rate (%) 
Refining and coal  85  65.9 
Food and tobacco  4,007  56.3 
Ceramics 532  55.6 
Basic chemical  468  55.1 
Apparel 3,447  54.1 
Textiles 1,622  52.0 
Electronic equipment  936  52.0 
Leather product  276  51.1 
Other chemical  977  51.0 
Paper 406  50.7 
Beverages 488  50.2 
Glass 320  50.0 
Other transport  1,098  49.1 
Non-metallic mineral  1,372  48.3 
Other manufacturing  2,590  48.0 
Printing 6,093  47.9 
Nonferrous metal  135  46.7 
Electrical equipment  1,622  46.2 
Footwear 255  45.5 
Rubber products  301  44.2 
Plastics 1,594  44.2 
Motor vehicle and parts  1,572  43.0 
Industrial machinery  3,722  42.9 
Metal products  7,889  42.7 
Iron and steel  718  42.2 
Furniture 4,606  42.1 
Wood product  4,101  41.4 
Professional equipment  1,185  40.0 
Total 52,263  46.7 
 
of establishments in 1993-94 and the proportion of establishments with ‘exit’ status in 
1996-97 across 28 broad sectors of the manufacturing industry.
7
In addition to the 52,263 establishments in the 1993-94, there are 71,748 establishments in 
the 1996-97 census data. However, after match-merging both data sets and dropping 
                                                 
7 There are 206 establishments with missing sector classification not shown in Table 1.   13
observations with missing information on any of the measures used in estimating the 
regression model as discussed below, we end up with 31,682 useable observations of 
establishments existing in 1994 for the exit regression and 16,676 observations of 
establishments existing in both 1993-94 and 1996-97 for the change in employment 
regression.
8 Table 3 provides a summary of the characteristics of establishments in terms 
of the dependent and independent variables used in the exit probability regressions.
9
Table 3: Dependent and independent variables in the exit probability regression 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min   Max. 
Exit status  0.345  0.475  0  1 
dERA 7.770  5.692  -5  41 
%dERA 0.375  0.535  -3.000  0.833 
%dPower 0.047  0.031  -0.021  0.113 
log(avgcost) 94 -1.321 0.832  -6.422 6.032 
mktshare94 0.005 0.022 0.000 0.997 
MUnumest94 1.496 3.000  1  50 
diversified94 0.969 0.175  0  1 
HHIsales94 0.041 0.057 0.003 0.995 
CR494 0.266 0.169 0.067  1 
entryrate97 0.638 0.330 0.111 6.175 
family 0.095  0.293  0  1 
ptyltd 0.653  0.476  0  1 
public 0.001  0.038  0  1 
Number of establishments  31,682     
 
5.  Results 
Table 4 summarises logit regression estimates based on equation (1) using three different 
measures of the extent of trade liberalisation namely the reduction in ERA in level  
                                                 
8 The number of observation in the employment change regression is lower because it represents the number 
of surviving establishments. Also there are some establishments for which the employment figure is 
missing.   14





dy/dx Coefficient Std. 
Error 
dy/dx Coefficient  Std. 
Error 
dy/dx 
Dependent variable: Exit probability in 1997           
dERA  0.007 *  0.004  0.002             
%dERA        -0.036   0.030  -0.008        
%dPower               0.817 *  0.480  0.184 
log(avgcost)94 -0.047 *** 0.015  -0.010  -0.047  *** 0.015 -0.011 -0.046  ***  0.015  -0.010 
mktshare94 0.312  0.581  0.070  0.343    0.586 0.077 0.316    0.586  0.071 
MUnumest94 0.083 *** 0.006 0.008  0.033  *** 0.006 0.007 0.034  ***  0.006  0.008 
diversified94 0.850 *** 0.068 0.205  0.853  *** 0.068 0.206 0.849  ***  0.068  0.205 
HHIsales94 0.121  0.438  0.027  0.189    0.440 0.043 0.099    0.438  0.022 
CR494 0.419 *** 0.160 0.094  0.370  ** 0.161 0.083 0.429  ***  0.160  0.096 
entryrate97 -0.019  0.038  -0.004  -0.026  **  0.038 -0.006 -0.021    0.038  -0.005 
family 0.114 **  0.045  0.026  0.114  *** 0.045 0.026 0.114  **  0.045  0.026 
ptyltd -0.203 ***  0.029  -0.046  -0.203  *** 0.029 -0.046 -0.203  ***  0.029  -0.046 
public 1.008 ***  0.326  0.245  0.984    0.330 0.240 1.008  ***  0.329  0.245 
constant -0.697 ***  0.070    -0.687 *** 0.070    -0.697 ***  0.071   
Pseudo-R
2: 0.028       0.028      0.028      
Number of establishments: 31,682                 
 
(dERA) and in relative terms (%dERA) and the relative reduction the power of tariff 
industry with a four percentage point (approximately one standard deviation) higher 
reduction show an average of less than one percent higher probability of exit.
10 Using the 
relative measure of ERA reduction does not provide any further evidence that the 
reduction in ERA is positively associated with exit probability. In fact, the sign of the 
coefficient is negative, though it is not statistically significant. On the other hand, when 
(%dPower). From the second column, for example, establishments in a four-digit ANZSIC 
we use the relative reduction in the power of tariff as shown in the last column in Table 4, 
                                                                                                                                                   
9 See Appendix Table 1 for the definition of the variables. Furthermore, Appendix Tables 2 and 3 provide a 
summary of the variables in the output and employment adjustment regressions. 
10 In all regression tables, *, **, *** indicate statistically significant at 10, 5 and 1% level of significance, 
respectively. Also, all regressions include two digit sector and state dummy variables and an indicator 
variable whether or not the establishment exists in 1992-93.    15
we find a stronger positive relationship between trade liberalisation and exit probability. 
Overall, these findings indicate that measuring the extent of trade liberalisation and thus 
increased competition effects correctly is important in assessing the effects on domestic 
establishments. 
Before we discuss the effects of trade liberalisation on establishment size, it is insightful to 
see some of the estimated effects of the covariates and compare them to the theoretical 
predictions. First, consistent with the falling demand predictions, establishments which 
belong to management units with multiple establishments and with multiple 
establishments operating in more than a single four digit ANZSIC industry are more likely 
to exit following trade liberalisation. More interestingly, however, is the negative 
relationship between the average cost before the reduction of ERA period and the 
probability of exit after the reduction. This indicates that less efficient establishments are 
not necessarily more likely to exit. Finally, establishments in industry with a higher CR4 
ratio are on average more likely to exit. These last two observations seem to be consistent 
with the idea that when some establishments have enough market power, they may be able 
to survive better than the more efficient establishments when demand is falling.  
Table 5 summarises the estimation results of ordinary least square regression of 
percentage change in total sales. As discussed earlier, the surviving establishments might 
be able to move down their cost curve following trade liberalisation and thus gain in  
productivity. In fact, our results, especially with the relative measure of reduction in ERA, 
suggest that surviving establishments in industries experiencing a more intensive trade 
liberalisation have on average become smaller. Also interesting is the finding that less 
efficient establishments in terms of average cost and those in more concentrated industries 
have increased their sales.  
   16
Table 5: Estimates of change in output size regression  
Variables  Coefficient Std. 
Error 
Coefficient Std.  Error  Coefficient  Std. 
Error 
Dependent variable: % change in total sales 
dERA -0.003   0.002           
%dERA     -0.031  **  0.016       
%dPower           -0.335    0.234 
log(avgcost) 94 0.273 *** 0.008  0.272  ***  0.008  0.273    0.008 
mktshare94 -2.178 *** 0.294  -0.218  ***  0.294  -0.218  ***  0.294 
MUnumest94 -0.018 *** 0.005  -0.018  ***  0.005  -0.018  ***  0.005 
diversified94 0.350 *** 0.046  0.351  ***  0.046  0.350  ***  0.046 
HHIsales94 0.557 ** 0.229  0.601  *** 0.230  0.566  **  0.229 
CR494 -0.089  0.081 -0.109    0.082  -0.092    0.081 
entryrate97 -0.004  0.019 -0.004    0.019  -0.003    0.019 
family -0.005   0.024  -0.005   0.024  -0.005   0.024 
ptyltd -0.020   0.014  -0.021    0.015  -0.020    0.015 
public -0.529 **  0.220  -0.558  **  0.221  -0.529  **  0.220 
constant 0.572 ***  0.036  0.562  ***  0.036     
R
2   0.090      0.090      0.090     
Number of establishments: 16,696 
 
From Table 6, we can see how the surviving establishments adjust to the increased 
competition following trade liberalisation in terms of size of employment.  Only the 
%dERA measure of trade liberalisation shows the expected relationship that increased 
foreign competition may force establishments to improve their efficiency through 
reduction in employment. Consistent with this is the finding that establishments with 
higher average costs and which are in more concentrated industries show larger reduction 
in employment. 
Furthermore, following Gaston (1998), the last set of tables provides re-estimation of the 
probability regression for two separate sub-samples according to the intensity of import 
and export of the four digit industry. In terms of exit probability, from Table 7 there is no  
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Table 6: Estimates of change in employment size regression  
Variables  Coefficient Std. 
Error 
Coefficient Std.  Error  Coefficient  Std. 
Error 
Dependent variable: % change in employment 
dERA 0.001    0.001           
%dERA       -0.024  ***  0.010       
%dPower             0.068    0.148 
log(avgcost) 94 -0.064 ***  0.005  -0.065  ***  0.005  -0.064  ***  0.005 
mktshare94 -0.371 **  0.181  -0.367  **  0.181  -0.432  ***  0.185 
MUnumest94 0.002   0.002  0.002    0.002  -0.001    0.003 
diversified94 0.004   0.021  0.005    0.021  0.051  *  0.029 
HHIsales94 0.333 **  0.147  0.372  **  0.148  0.337  **  0.147 
CR494 -0.071   0.051  -0.095  *  0.052  -0.073    0.052 
entryrate97 -0.016   0.012  -0.018    0.015  -0.017    0.012 
family -0.025  *  0.015  -0.025   0.015  -0.025   0.015 
ptyltd 0.036  ***  0.009  0.035  ***  0.009  0.036  ***  0.009 
public 0.274  **  0.140  0.247  *  0.141  0.266  *  0.140 
constant -0.099  ***  0.031  -0.101 ***  0.031  -0.091 ***  0.023 
R
2   0.021      0.021      0.021     
Number of establishments: 16,676 
 
 





dy/dx Coefficient Std. 
Error 
dy/dx Coefficient  Std. 
Error 
dy/dx 
Dependent variable: Exit probability           
dERA  -0.011   0.008  -0.003             
%dERA        0.026   0.087  0.006        
%dPower               -1.791   1.111  -0.408 
log(avgcost) 94 -0.048  0.032  -0.011  -0.046    0.032  -0.010 -0.049    0.032 -0.011 
mktshare94 0.295  0.992  0.067  0.247    0.991  0.056 0.300    0.992 0.068 
MUnumest94 0.086 *** 0.029 0.020  0.086  *** 0.029  0.020 0.086  *** 0.029 0.020 
diversified94 0.519 *** 0.169 0.125  0.522  *** 0.169  0.125 0.521  *** 0.169 0.125 
HHIsales94 -0.766  0.700  -0.175  -0.510    0.673  -0.116 -0.775    0.694 -0.177 
CR494 0.879 *** 0.318 0.200  0.797  ** 0.315  0.182 0.873  *** 0.316 0.199 
entryrate97 0.120  0.180  0.027  0.098    0.182  0.022 0.156    0.183 0.036 
family 0.230 *  0.117  0.054  0.230  * 0.117  0.054  0.231  ** 0.117  0.054 
ptyltd -0.131 *  0.071  -0.030  -0.128  *  0.071  -0.030 -0.132  *  0.071 -0.030 
public 1.306   0.807  0.315  1.330    0.808  0.321 1.305    0.806 0.315 
constant  -0.795 ***  0.174                 
Pseudo-R
2:  0.024       0.024     0.024      
Number of establishments: 5,720                   18
further evidence for the positive relationship between the probability of exit and the extent 
of trade liberalisation when we limit our samples to establishment in the high import 
intensive sectors only. From Table 8, it appears that establishments in the high export 
industries with a higher relative reduction in ERA are less likely to exit. 





dy/dx Coefficient Std. 
Error 
dy/dx Coefficient  Std. 
Error 
dy/dx 
Dependent variable: Exit probability           
dERA  -0.008   0.006  -0.002             
%dERA        -0.086 **  0.037  -0.020        
%dPower               -0.792   0.723  -0.181 
log(avgcost) 94 -0.030  0.026  -0.007  -0.032    0.026  -0.007 -0.030    0.026 -0.007 
mktshare94 -0.717  0.815  -0.164  -0.758    0.816  -0.174 -0.733    0.814 -0.168 
MUnumest94 0.031 *** 0.008 0.007  0.031  *** 0.008  0.007 0.031  *** 0.008 0.007 
diversified94 0.756 *** 0.103 0.183  0.760  *** 0.103  0.184 0.756  *** 0.103 0.183 
HHIsales94 0.681  0.685  0.156  0.634    0.686  0.145 0.722    0.684 0.165 
CR494 -0.390  0.265  -0.089  -0.311    0.265  -0.071 -0.396    0.265 -0.091 
entryrate97 -0.248 ** 0.105  -0.057  -0.261  **  0.104  -0.060 -0.241  **  0.104 -0.055 
family 0.146 *  0.079  0.034  0.147  *  0.079  0.034 0.146  *  0.079 0.034 
ptyltd -0.141 ***  0.051  -0.032  -0.146  *** 0.051  -0.033 -0.141  ***  0.051 -0.033 
public 0.077   0.471  0.017  -0.028    0.472  -0.006 0.080    0.471 0.018 
constant -0.284 **  0.118   -0.343 **  0.116    -0.290 **  0.117   
                    
Pseudo-R
2:  0.035       0.035     0.035      
Number of establishments: 10,047                 
 
From Tables 9 and 10, we find that the surviving establishments are more likely to reduce 
their output size regardless of import or export intensity. In fact, from Table 10, the 
reduction in output size among establishments in high intensive export sectors appears to 
be stronger than shown by the full sample in Table 5. This provides further contradictory 
evidence of productivity gains from a downward movement along the cost curve as 
establishment expand sales to overseas markets following trade liberalisation.  
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Table 9: Estimates of change in output size regression – import intensive industries 
Variables  Coefficient Std. 
Error 
Coefficient Std.  Error  Coefficient  Std. 
Error 
Dependent variable: % change in total sales 
dERA -0.007  *  0.004          
%dERA       0.0126    0.045       
%dPower             -0.835    0.561 
log(avgcost) 94 0.322 ***  0.017  0.323  ***  0.017  0.322  ***  0.017 
mktshare94 -1.142 ***  0.449  -1.441  ***  0.449  -1.431  ***  0.449 
MUnumes94t 0.015    0.020  0.0123    0.020 0.014   0.020 
diversified94 0.111   0.115  0.120    0.116  0.112    0.115 
HHIsales94 -0.399   0.340  -0.234    0.326  -0.365    0.338 
CR494 0.396 **  0.158  0.339  **  0.155  0.381  **  0.157 
entryrate97 0.238 ***  0.088  0.226  **  0.089  0.253  ***  0.090 
family 0.083    0.063  0.080   0.063  0.083   0.063 
ptyltd 0.000    0.035  0.001    0.035  -0.000    0.035 
public -0.898  *  0.518  -0.854  *  0.518  -0.896  *  0.518 
constant 0.417  ***  0.086  0.394 ***  0.086  0.416 ***  0.086 
R
2   0.137      0.137      0.137     
Number of establishments: 2,984 
 
Table 10: Estimates of change in output size regression – export intensive industries 
Variables  Coefficient Std. 
Error 
Coefficient Std.  Error  Coefficient  Std. 
Error 
Dependent variable: % change in total sales 
dERA -0.008  ***  0.003           
%dERA       -0.027    0.021       
%dPower             -0.868  **  0.360 
log(avgcost) 94 0.271 ***  0.014  0.270  ***  0.014  0.271  ***  0.014 
mktshare94 -2.756 ***  0.396  -2.785  ***  0.369  -2.778  ***  0.396 
MUnumest94 0.005   0.007  0.005    0.007  0.005    0.007 
diversified94 0.233 ***  0.068  0.234  ***  0.068  0.234  ***  0.068 
HHIsales94 0.999 ***  0.375  1.024  ***  0.375  1.051  ***  0.375 
CR494 -0.456 ***  0.135  -0.415  ***  0.135  -0.463  ***  0.136 
entryrate97 0.005   0.049  0.022    0.049  0.011    0.049 
family 0.021    0.043  0.021   0.043  0.021   0.043 
ptyltd -0.027    0.026  -0.031    0.026  -0.028    0.026 
public -0.271    0.275  -0.294    0.277  -0.269    0.275 
constant 0.637  ***  0.060  0.592 ***  0.059  0.632   0.060 
R
2   0.091      0.089      0.090     
Number of establishments: 5,273   20
Finally, comparing the results in Tables 11 and 12, there seems to be some evidence for 
establishments in import intensive sectors to experience a larger reduction in employment 
than those in the export intensive sectors possibly indicating a larger import competing 
pressure from trade liberalisation. 
Table 11: Estimates of change in employment size regression – import intensive 
industries 
Variables  Coefficient Std. 
Error 
Coefficient Std.  Error  Coefficient  Std. 
Error 
Dependent variable: % change in employment 
dERA -0.009  ***  0.003          
%dERA       -0.047    0.029       
%dPower             -1.219  ***  0.361 
log(avgcost) 94 -0.061 ***  0.011  -0.061  ***  0.011  -0.061  ***  0.011 
mktshare94 -0.247   0.301  -0.265    0.301  -0.250    0.301 
MUnumes94t -0.006    0.013  -0.006    0.013 -0.006    0.013 
diversified94 0.033   0.078  0.036    0.078  0.034    0.078 
HHIsales94 -0.108   0.224  0.098    0.216  -0.088    0.222 
CR494 0.135   0.102  0.034    0.102  0.123    0.101 
entryrate97 0.088   0.059  0.091    0.059  0.111  *  0.060 
family 0.014    0.042  0.011   0.042  0.014   0.042 
ptyltd 0.042  *  0.023  0.043  *  0.023  0.041  *  0.023 
public 0.574  *  0.035  0.610  *  0.345  0.569  *  0.345 
constant -0.152  ***  0.056  -0.157 ***  0.057  -0.149 ***  0.057 
R
2   0.025      0.022      0.025     
Number of establishments: 3,035 
 
6.  Conclusion 
In this paper, we investigated how trade liberalisation might bring improvement in 
productivity. In particular, following Gibson and Harris (1996), we estimated reduced 
form regression models motivated by the declining industry literature using Australian 
establishment level data to look at whether or not inter-sectoral variation in the extent of 
gradual reductions in effective rates of assistance (ERA) is associated with variation in the  
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Table 12: Estimates of change in employment size regression – export intensive 
industries 
Variables  Coefficient Std. 
Error 
Coefficient Std.  Error  Coefficient  Std. 
Error 
Dependent variable: % change in employment 
dERA -0.004  **  0.002           
%dERA       -0.048  ***  0.014       
%dPower             -0.417  *  0.234 
log(avgcost) 94 -0.066 ***  0.009  -0.067  ***  0.009  -0.066  ***  0.009 
mktshare94 -0.659 **  0.312  -0.590  **  0.258  -0.583  **  0.259 
MUnumest94 -0.002   0.004  -0.001    0.004  -0.001    0.004 
diversified94 0.071   0.045  0.071    0.044  0.070    0.045 
HHIsales94 0.277   0.249  0.248    0.246  0.284    0.246 
CR494 -0.147 *  0.089  -0.112    0.088  -0.146  *  0.089 
entryrate97 0.019   0.032  0.011    0.032  0.021    0.032 
family -0.014    0.028  -0.013   0.028  -0.014   0.028 
ptyltd 0.039    0.017  0.038  **  0.017  0.039  **  0.017 
public 0.322  *  0.179  0.263    0.180  0.322  *  0.179 
constant -0.099  **  0.039  -0.130 ***  0.038  -0.102 ***  0.039 
R
2   0.022      0.023      0.021     
Number of establishments: 5,267 
 
probability of establishment exit. In addition, we also investigated the possibility of 
productivity improvement gained through economies of scale as surviving establishments 
expand their outputs or through their reducing x-inefficiency by cutting employment. 
We found that the documented gains in productivity following Australian trade 
liberalisation in the mid-1990s appeared to come more from reduced x-inefficiency 
through employment shedding than from the exit of less efficient establishments or 
economies of scale. We found evidence for this productivity enhancing channel among the 
establishments in both import and export intensive sectors. However, the effects seemed to 
be stronger for establishments in the import intensive sectors, possibly indicating the 
stronger competitive pressures resulted from trade liberalisation. It should be noted 
however that the evidence we found might include possible effects from better technology 
in cheaper embodied imports. Lastly, we found that our results are sensitive to the type of   22
proxy of variation in the extent of trade liberalisation we used. Overall, using percentage 
reduction in effective rates of assistance (ERA) provided the weakest link between trade 
liberalisation and the channels of productivity gains. Quite intuitively, using relative 
changes in ERA or in 1+ERA as percentages of the base year figures gave us stronger 
links.  
Overall, our findings support that of Fernandes (2007) in the sense that trade liberalisation 
increases overall productivity by pressuring firms to improve their internal efficiency 
mostly through labour adjustments rather than by forcing less efficient firms to exit. In 
terms of policy implication, this seems to suggest that how easy firms can adjust their 
employment can be crucial. Thus, further studies which focus on the interplay between 
labour policy and firm adjustment during trade liberalisation is potentially worthwhile. 
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Appendix 1: Data source and definition 
The main data set used in the paper is constructed from unpublished, establishment level 
data obtained from two ABS Manufacturing Censuses conducted for financial years 1993-
94 and 1996-97. The definitions of the variables constructed based on the information in 
the data sets are provided below: 
•  Value of output = Total sales and transfers out of goods produced and not 
produced + selected other income (govt. subsidies, service income, income from rent, 
leasing and hiring, and imputed commission) 
•  Quantity of output = Value of output / 3-digit Producer Price Index 
•  Value of labour = Total salaries and wages  
•  Quantity of labour = Total number of employees at June 30 
•  Value of raw materials = Total purchases and transfers-in of raw materials and 
goods for resale + selected expenses (motor vehicle running expenses, outward freight, 
rent, leasing and hiring expenses, subcontract/commission expenses, repair and 
maintenance expenses, and imputed commission paid)  
•  Quantity of raw materials = Value of raw materials / 3-digit Material Price Index 
•  Value of capital input = Value of output - Value of labour - Value of raw materials 
•  Quantity of capital input = Value of capital / simple average of Private machinery 
and equipment investment implicit deflator and Non-dwelling construction implicit 
deflator 
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Appendix Table 1: Variables definition 
Variables Definition 
Exit  = 1 if in 1993-94 census but not in 1996-97 census; 0 otherwise 
dlogout =  log(Sales97)-log(Sales94) 
dlogemp =  log(Employment97)-log(Employment94) 
dERA =  ERA97-ERA94
%dERA =  (ERA97-ERA94)/ ERA94
%dPower =  (ERA97-ERA94)/ (1+ERA94) 
log(avgcost) 94 = log[(wages+salaries+purchases of materials & goods for sale)/Sales)] 94
mktshare94 = Sales94 / Total sales94 in the same four digit ANZSIC 
MUnumest94 = Number of establishments (ES) under the same management unit (MU) 
diversified94 = 1 if the MU has multi ES and  in more than 1 four digit ANZSIC; 0 otherwise 
HHIsales94 = Four digit ANZSIC level Herfindahl-Hirschman index based on Sales94
CR494 = Four digit ANZSIC level top four ES concentration ration based on Sales94
entryrate94
= Number of ES in 1996-97 which are not in 1993-94 / Number of ES in 1996-97 (at the four 
digit ANZSIC level) 
family  = 1 if type of legal organisation is “7-Family partnership”; 0 otherwise 
ptyltd  = 1 if type of legal organisation is “1-Proprietary, 2-Limited, or 3-Proprietary limited”; 0 
otherwise 




Appendix Table 2: Dependent and independent variables in the output regression 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min   Max. 
dlogout 0.068  0.795  -13.549  8.855 
dERA 5.559  3.743  -2.000  20.000 
%dERA 0.356  0.446  -3.000  0.769 
log(avgcost) 94 -1.305 0.789  -5.621 6.032 
mktshare94 0.005 0.000 0.022 0.997 
MUnumest94 1.274 1.725  1  50 
diversified94 0.035 0.184  0  1 
HHIsales94 0.039 0.055 0.003 0.995 
CR494 0.258 0.166 0.067 0.964 
entryrate94 0.632 0.328 0.111 6.175 
family 0.084  0.277  0  1 
ptyltd 0.686  0.464  0  1 
public 0.001  0.027  0  1 
Number of establishments  16,696     
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Appendix Table 3: Dependent and independent variables in the employment 
regression 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min   Max. 
dlogemp -0.005  0.488  -3.829  4.339 
dERA 7.837  5.541  -5  41 
%dERA 0.403  0.496  -3  0.833 
log(avgcost) 94 -1.292 0.803  -5.621 6.032 
mktshare94 0.005 0.022 0.000 0.022 
MUnumest94 1.279 1.740  1  50 
diversified94 0.968 0.176  0  1 
HHIsales94 0.040 0.055 0.003 0.995 
CR494 0.259 0.166 0.067 0.964 
entryrate94 0.632 0.329 0.111 6.175 
family 0.084  0.277  0  1 
ptyltd 0.685  0.465  0  1 
public 0.001  0.027  0  1 
Number of establishments  16,676     
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